The
Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – The way Forward
Introduction:
The Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of India, enacted in 2016, marked a watershed moment
in the nation's economic reforms. Replacing a convoluted and ineffective maze
of archaic laws, the IBC introduced a unified, time-bound, and creditor-driven
framework for resolving corporate insolvency. Its primary objectives:
maximizing the value of distressed assets, promoting entrepreneurship, ensuring
availability of credit, and balancing the interests of all stakeholders. While
the IBC has undeniably transformed India’s distressed asset landscape, its
journey has been one of continuous learning and adaptation, marked by both
formidable challenges and significant evolutionary modifications. This article delves
into the complexities of its implementation, highlights key statutory and
regulatory reforms, and proposes a roadmap for its continued strengthening,
substantiated by recent statistics.
Major Issues
faced in the implementation of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in
India. These challenges are often interconnected and contribute to the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of the resolution process
Issues in
IBC Implementation
Delays and
Procedural Issues:
Prolonged
Resolution Time:
The IBC was
envisioned as a time-bound process, with an initial target of 180 days,
extendable to 330 days. However, the average time taken for CIRP to culminate
in a resolution plan or liquidation consistently exceeds this. This delay
erodes the value of the corporate debtor's assets, increases the resolution
costs (including fees for the Resolution Professional and legal expenses), and
ultimately leads to lower recoveries for creditors. The longer a company
remains in limbo, the more its operational viability deteriorates.
Reason:
This is a cascading effect of several factors, including judicial backlogs,
frequent litigation, and inadequate infrastructure.
Judicial
Backlogs and Shortage of Benches/Judges:
The National
Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)
are the primary adjudicating authorities for IBC cases. They face a severe
shortage of judicial and technical members relative to the massive influx of
cases. This leads to delays at every stage: admission of applications, hearing
of interim applications, approval of resolution plans, and disposal of appeals.
The limited number of benches means fewer cases can be heard simultaneously,
creating bottlenecks.
Impact:
This directly contradicts the time-bound objective of the IBC and contributes
significantly to value erosion.
Adjudication
Process Inefficiencies:
Beyond the
sheer volume of cases, the way NCLT and NCLAT proceedings are conducted can
also be inefficient. This includes frequent adjournments, a lack of specialized
knowledge among some members for complex financial or sector-specific cases,
and procedural ambiguities that lead to prolonged arguments. Sometimes, even
basic procedural requirements can cause significant delays.
Example:
Debates over the 'admitted debt' or technical defects in applications can drag
on, consuming valuable judicial time.
Delays in
Admission of Cases:
While the IBC
mandates a 14-day period for the NCLT to admit or reject an application for
CIRP, in practice, this timeline is rarely met. Corporate debtors often raise
various objections, sometimes frivolous, to delay the admission of the
insolvency petition. This pre-admission litigation can last for several months,
or even over a year, during which the corporate debtor's financial health may
further deteriorate, leaving fewer viable assets for resolution.
Impact:
This initial delay impacts the "going concern" principle, as the
company continues to spiral downwards before formal intervention.
Multiplicity
of Proceedings:
Despite the
IBC being a comprehensive code, its interplay with other existing laws (e.g.,
Prevention of Money Laundering Act - PMLA, Securities and Exchange Board of
India - SEBI regulations, Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act - RERA,
tax laws) often leads to parallel investigations or proceedings. This creates
jurisdictional conflicts, diverts the attention and resources of the Resolution
Professional, and can stall the CIRP or liquidation process, as assets may be
provisionally attached by other agencies.
Example:
ED attaching assets under PMLA can hinder asset monetization under IBC.
Value
Realization and Creditor Concerns:
Low
Recovery Rates/High Haircuts:
While the IBC
has improved recovery rates compared to previous regimes, the
"haircuts" (the difference between the admitted claim and the amount
realized by creditors) remain substantial. Creditors, particularly financial
creditors, often recover only a fraction of their outstanding dues. While some
haircuts are inevitable in distressed situations, consistently deep haircuts
raise questions about the code's ability to maximize value for all
stakeholders.
Context:
This is partly due to many cases being "legacy NPAs" that are already
in an advanced state of distress when admitted to IBC, leaving little value to
recover.
Ineffective
Liquidation Process:
When a
resolution plan fails or is not approved, the corporate debtor goes into
liquidation. The liquidation process itself is often plagued by delays,
challenges in asset identification and valuation, difficulties in finding
buyers for distressed assets, and legal complexities. This leads to further
value erosion and poor realization for creditors, making liquidation an
unattractive outcome.
Reason:
The absence of a robust distressed asset market and the stigma associated with
buying assets from liquidation also contribute.
Identification
and Realization of Avoidance Transactions:
The IBC
provides for the clawback of preferential, undervalued, fraudulent, or
extortionate credit transactions that occurred before the insolvency
commencement date. However, identifying these transactions, gathering
sufficient evidence, and successfully litigating them before the NCLT/NCLAT is
a complex, time-consuming, and resource-intensive process. Promoters often
conceal such transactions, making it difficult for the Resolution Professional
to recover these assets for the creditors.
Impact:
Failure to recover these assets directly reduces the pool available for
creditor distribution.
Promoters
Exploiting "Haircuts" and Loopholes:
Despite the
introduction of Section 29A to bar defaulting promoters from reacquiring their
companies, concerns persist about promoters attempting "backdoor
entries" or using proxies to bid for their distressed assets at
significantly reduced valuations after "cleaning" the company's
balance sheet through the IBC process. While Section 29A addresses direct
reacquisition, complex corporate structures and indirect influence can
sometimes still pose challenges.
Perception:
This can create a perception of unfairness where the original defaulters
benefit from the system.
Creditor
Hierarchy and Discrimination:
The IBC
establishes a waterfall mechanism for the distribution of liquidation proceeds.
While financial creditors generally have higher priority, there have been
debates and concerns regarding the equitable treatment of various classes of
creditors, particularly operational creditors and homebuyers (who were later
recognized as financial creditors). Issues arise concerning the proportionality
of recovery and potential for discrimination in resolution plans.
Example:
Disputes over treatment of secured vs. unsecured financial creditors or the
practical challenges faced by a large number of scattered operational
creditors.
Stakeholder
Behaviour and Capacity:
Behavioural
Issues and Lack of Cooperation:
The success of
IBC depends heavily on the cooperative behaviour of all stakeholders – debtors,
creditors, Resolution Professionals, and even government agencies. However,
often there's a lack of genuine cooperation. Debtors may resort to delaying
tactics, frivolous litigation, or non-disclosure of information. Creditors,
particularly a fragmented Committee of Creditors (CoC), may have divergent
interests, leading to disagreements and delays in approving resolution plans.
Impact:
This adversarial environment slows down the process and can undermine the
objective of revival.
Professional
Misconduct and Competence of IPs:
The role of
Insolvency Professionals (IPs) is central to the IBC process. However, issues
related to their competence, ethical conduct, and independence have emerged.
Instances of IPs not adhering to strict timelines, lacking the specialized
knowledge for complex cases, or facing conflicts of interest have been
reported. There are also concerns about the quality of valuations provided by
registered valuers.
Regulatory
Challenge: Ensuring consistent high standards across the large and growing
pool of IPs is a continuous challenge for the IBBI.
Capacity
Building for Stakeholders:
Many
stakeholders, including smaller creditors, operational creditors, and even some
corporate debtors, may not fully understand the intricacies of the IBC. This
lack of awareness can lead to delays, incorrect filings, or inability to
effectively participate in the process, thereby undermining their rights and
the efficiency of the resolution.
Need:
There's a need for continuous education and awareness programs.
Information
Asymmetry:
Accurate and
comprehensive information about the corporate debtor's assets, liabilities, and
business operations is crucial for informed decision-making by the Committee of
Creditors and potential resolution applicants. However, obtaining this
information can be challenging due to poor record-keeping by distressed
companies, non-cooperation from erstwhile management, or issues with data
accuracy from Information Utilities. This asymmetry hinders effective due
diligence and robust bidding.
Specific
Sectoral Challenges:
Complex
Group Structures and Cross-Border Insolvency:
Many large
Indian conglomerates operate through complex, multi-layered group structures,
often with inter-company transactions and cross-guarantees. The IBC, in its
initial form, was primarily designed for individual corporate debtors. Dealing
with insolvency of a group where entities are interdependent and have
assets/liabilities across different jurisdictions (cross-border insolvency) is
highly complex, requiring a sophisticated legal framework that India is still
developing.
Legal Gap:
The absence of a specific group insolvency framework and a robust cross-border
insolvency law leads to ad-hoc judicial interventions, which can be
inconsistent.
Real Estate
Sector Specific Issues:
The real
estate sector presents unique challenges due to the large number of dispersed
creditors (homebuyers), long project cycles, reliance on multiple regulatory
approvals (RERA, local authorities), and often incomplete projects. Resolving
real estate insolvencies involves complex issues of project completion,
transfer of development rights, and managing the interests of thousands of
homebuyers, making it particularly challenging for IPs and NCLTs.
Impact:
This often leads to highly protracted and contentious CIRPs.
MSME
Challenges:
While the
Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP) was introduced for MSMEs to
provide a quicker and less formal resolution, its adoption and effective
implementation have faced hurdles. Many MSMEs lack the financial sophistication
or resources to initiate and navigate even a pre-pack process, and concerns
about potential abuse by promoters also exist.
Regulatory
and Policy Gaps:
Evolving
Jurisprudence and Inconsistency:
The IBC is a
relatively new law, and its provisions are continuously being interpreted and
refined by the NCLT, NCLAT, and the Supreme Court. While judicial
interpretations are essential for clarity, frequent and sometimes conflicting
pronouncements can lead to legal uncertainty, making it difficult for
stakeholders to predict outcomes and plan strategies.
Impact:
This can deter potential resolution applicants due to perceived legal risks.
Lack of
Defined Thresholds for Haircuts:
There is no
specific legal or regulatory guidance on what constitutes an
"acceptable" haircut for creditors. This often leads to intense
negotiations, disagreements within the CoC, and sometimes, challenges to
approved plans based on the perceived inadequacy of the offered recovery,
further delaying the process.
Debate:
The balance between maximizing value and achieving quick resolution often leads
to debates over the size of haircuts.
Challenges
in Post-Resolution Monitoring:
Once a
resolution plan is approved and implemented, there are limited formal
mechanisms for monitoring the compliance of the new management with the terms
of the plan, or the long-term viability of the resolved company. While the CoC
is dissolved, the onus largely shifts to the creditors to enforce the plan's
terms, which can be challenging, especially for larger consortiums or in cases
of non-compliance after a period.
Risk:
This lack of robust monitoring can lead to a return to distress if the plan is
not properly executed.
These issues collectively
highlight the need for continuous legislative, regulatory, and judicial reforms
to ensure the IBC realizes its full potential as a transformative insolvency
regime in India.
Modifications
Done in the Recent Past to Make it a Robust System
The IBC has
been subject to continuous amendments to address practical challenges and
judicial pronouncements. These changes, both statutory amendments and
regulatory tweaks, aim to enhance efficiency, transparency, and fairness.
Recognition
of Homebuyers as Financial Creditors (IBC (Amendment) Act, 2018):
Initially,
homebuyers were treated as operational creditors, often having limited say in
the resolution process and receiving meagre recoveries. This amendment
explicitly brought them under the ambit of 'financial creditors' with a deemed
financial debt.
Impact:
This was a monumental shift, giving homebuyers representation in the Committee
of Creditors (CoC) through an authorized representative (AR) and a significant
vote share, thereby empowering them to protect their interests in real estate
insolvency cases. It addressed a major social and economic concern.
Introduction
of Section 29A (Eligibility Criteria for Resolution Applicants - IBC
(Amendment) Act, 2018):
This was a
critical anti-cronyism measure. It disqualified certain categories of persons,
including defaulting promoters and those connected to them, from submitting a
resolution plan for the corporate debtor. The intent was to prevent
"backdoor entry" by individuals who contributed to the company's
financial distress.
Impact:
This significantly enhanced the integrity of the resolution process and
fostered a more credible market for distressed assets. It sent a strong signal
that defaulting promoters would not be allowed to regain control at a steep
discount without first clearing their past dues.
Introduction
of Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP) for MSMEs (IBC
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2021, later replaced by Act):
Recognizing
the unique challenges faced by MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises),
PPIRP was introduced as a faster and more cost-effective out-of-court
resolution mechanism. It allows the existing management to remain in control
(debtor-in-possession model) and present a base resolution plan, subject to
creditor approval and NCLT oversight.
Impact:
Aims to reduce the burden on NCLTs for smaller cases, preserve MSME businesses,
and minimize disruption to their operations, thereby facilitating quicker
resolutions and safeguarding jobs.
Mandatory
Timeline for CIRP Completion (Initially 270 days, extended to 330 days - IBC
(Amendment) Act, 2019):
To emphasize
the time-bound nature of the process, the maximum period for completion of CIRP
(including extensions and litigation period) was capped at 330 days. While this
timeline is still often breached in practice due to various factors, its
statutory backing provides a strong imperative for all stakeholders and
adjudicating authorities to expedite matters.
Impact:
It serves as a benchmark and a constant reminder to prevent undue delays,
ensuring that the distressed asset does not suffer further value erosion.
Strengthening
Information Utilities (IUs) (Ongoing Regulatory Amendments, e.g., IBBI
(Information Utilities) Regulations):
IUs are
central repositories of financial and operational debt information. Recent
modifications have aimed to strengthen their role by making data submission by
creditors more robust and verifiable. The objective is to reduce disputes over
the existence and amount of default, thereby speeding up the admission of CIRP
applications.
Impact:
Improved data quality from IUs leads to quicker verification of claims,
enhancing transparency and reducing initial litigation, which can significantly
cut down the time for CIRP admission.
Amendments
to IBBI (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations (Various amendments, including
in 2024 and 2025):
These
regulations govern the conduct, duties, and responsibilities of Insolvency
Professionals (IPs). Recent amendments have focused on enhancing their
accountability, ethical standards, and efficiency. This includes provisions
allowing IPs to resign under certain conditions, clarifying the ability of
Insolvency Professional Entities (IPEs) to utilize internal resources, and
strengthening the Authorization for Assignment (AFA) framework.
Impact:
Aims to improve the quality of insolvency professionals, ensuring they are
competent, independent, and adhere to high ethical standards, which is crucial
for the effective functioning of the IBC.
Relaxations
and Specific Provisions for Real Estate Allottees (IBBI (CIRP) (Amendment)
Regulations, 2025 (e.g., February 2025):
Building on
the recognition of homebuyers as financial creditors, these regulations
introduced specific provisions to address the unique challenges of real estate
projects. Key changes include:
Handing
Over Possession: The Resolution Professional, with CoC approval, can now
hand over possession of plots/apartments to homebuyers even while the CIRP is
ongoing, provided the allottee has fulfilled their obligations. This provides
much-needed relief to homebuyers.
Appointment
of Facilitators: Allows for the appointment of facilitators for sub-classes
within large creditor classes like homebuyers, to improve communication and
participation.
Participation
of Competent Authorities: CoC can invite relevant land authorities (e.g.,
NOIDA, HUDA) to meetings for inputs on regulatory and development matters,
which is crucial for real estate projects.
Reports on
Development Rights: RPs are mandated to prepare detailed reports on
development rights and approvals for real estate projects within 60 days,
providing clarity on viability.
Relaxations
for Homebuyer Associations: Empowered CoCs to relax conditions for
associations of homebuyers to participate as resolution applicants.
Impact:
These changes are designed to make real estate CIRPs more homebuyer-centric,
efficient, and increase the likelihood of project completion and value
preservation.
Enhanced
Disclosure Requirements, especially for Avoidance Transactions (IBBI (CIRP)
(Amendment) Regulations, 2025):
Recent
amendments, particularly in the May 2025 regulations, mandate RPs to include
comprehensive details of identified avoidance transactions (preferential,
undervalued, fraudulent) in the Information Memorandum provided to potential
resolution applicants.
Impact:
This ensures greater transparency for prospective bidders, allowing them to
make informed decisions about the corporate debtor's true financial position
and potential liabilities/recoveries from such transactions. It also encourages
more proactive identification and pursuit of these transactions.
Facilitating
Part-Wise Resolution and Sale of Assets (IBBI (CIRP) (Fourth Amendment)
Regulations, 2025 - May 2025):
This
significant amendment allows Resolution Professionals, with CoC approval, to
invite resolution plans not just for the corporate debtor as a whole, but also
for specific business segments or for the sale of one or more of its assets.
This creates a "dual-track" mechanism.
Impact:
This provides greater flexibility, especially for large, diversified corporate
debtors, allowing viable parts of the business to be resolved faster or sold
off, preventing value erosion in healthy segments, and attracting a broader
range of investors who might be interested only in specific assets or business
units.
Harmonizing
Payments for Dissenting Financial Creditors & Mandatory Presentation of All
Plans (IBBI (CIRP) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2025 - May 2025):
Dissenting
Creditors: Where a resolution plan provides for staged payments, financial
creditors who did not vote in Favor of the resolution plan must now be paid at
least pro-rata and in priority over those who voted in Favor, at each
stage. This ensures fairness and protects the rights of minority dissenting
creditors.
All Plans
to CoC: RPs are now mandated to present all resolution plans
received to the CoC, including those that are non-compliant, along with details
of non-compliance. Previously, RPs would often filter out non-compliant plans.
Impact:
The dissenting creditor provision strengthens procedural justice and encourages
more critical scrutiny within the CoC. The mandatory presentation of all plans
increases transparency and empowers the CoC with complete information for their
decision-making, reducing RP discretion and fostering a more competitive
bidding environment.
These
continuous modifications underscore the Indian government and the IBBI's
commitment to making the IBC a more effective, efficient, and fair mechanism
for resolving insolvency, adapting to the dynamic economic and legal landscape.
Further
Action Plans to Make the Implementation More Effective
Enhancing
Adjudication and Infrastructure:
Increase
NCLT/NCLAT Bench Strength:
The single
most critical bottleneck in IBC implementation is the overburdened National
Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(NCLAT). A significant and sustained increase in the number of benches,
judicial members, and technical members is paramount. This isn't just about
filling existing vacancies but actively expanding the capacity to meet the
growing caseload.
Action:
This requires a dedicated recruitment drive, streamlined appointment processes,
and adequate budgetary allocation. The government must treat NCLT/NCLAT
expansion as a high priority infrastructure project.
Establish
Dedicated IBC Benches:
Within the
expanded NCLT/NCLAT, creating specialized benches solely dedicated to IBC
matters, or even sub-specialized benches for complex areas like real estate,
group insolvencies, or cross-border cases, can significantly improve
efficiency. Judges and technical members on these benches would develop deeper
expertise, leading to faster and more consistent decisions.
Action:
This involves specific judicial training and allocation of personnel based on
their aptitude and experience in commercial and insolvency law.
Digitization
and Automation of Processes:
While some
digitization has occurred, an end-to-end digital platform for all IBC
proceedings is essential. This includes e-filing of applications, claims, and
reports; online tracking of case progress; virtual hearings as a default; and
AI-assisted tools for document review and basic compliance checks. Automation
can reduce manual errors and processing times.
Action:
This requires significant investment in IT infrastructure, robust cybersecurity
measures, and training for all stakeholders (judges, lawyers, IPs, creditors)
to fully utilize the digital system.
Strengthen
IT Infrastructure for NCLT/NCLAT:
Beyond just
digitizing processes, the physical and digital infrastructure of the NCLT/NCLAT
must be robust. This includes high-speed internet, reliable video conferencing
facilities in every courtroom, secure data storage, and adequate technical
support staff. A poor digital backbone can negate the benefits of digitization.
Action:
Regular audits of IT systems, procurement of modern equipment, and a dedicated
IT support team for each bench.
Performance
Metrics and Accountability for Adjudicating Authorities:
Implement
clear, publicly available performance metrics for NCLT and NCLAT benches,
focusing on case disposal rates, adherence to timelines, and consistency of
judgments. While judicial independence is paramount, systematic data analysis
can highlight areas of inefficiency. Introduce internal accountability
mechanisms for delays not attributable to external factors.
Action:
Regular data collection and publication by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs
(MCA) and IBBI, with annual performance reviews and targeted interventions for
underperforming benches.
Improving
Resolution Process and Value Maximization:
Streamline
Resolution Plan Approval:
The NCLT's
role in approving resolution plans should primarily focus on ensuring
compliance with the IBC's provisions and not delve into the commercial wisdom
of the CoC. Develop clearer guidelines and precedents to limit the scope of
judicial review during plan approval, preventing unnecessary litigation and
delays.
Action:
This requires strong judicial pronouncements from the Supreme Court reinforcing
the "commercial wisdom" principle and NCLT/NCLAT training to adhere
to this narrower scope of review.
Explore
Out-of-Court Resolution Mechanisms:
While PPIRP is
a step in this direction for MSMEs, explore and formalize other pre-insolvency
or out-of-court restructuring and mediation frameworks for various corporate
debtors. This could include a robust framework for voluntary liquidation or
debt restructuring outside formal CIRP, reducing the burden on the NCLTs for
cases that can be resolved amicably.
Action:
Legislative amendments or separate regulations to recognize and enforce such
agreements, providing legal certainty and encouraging early resolution.
Strengthen
Enforcement of Resolution Plans:
Ensure that
once a resolution plan is approved by the NCLT, its implementation is swift and
strict. Introduce stronger provisions for penalizing non-compliance by the
successful resolution applicant. This includes potential forfeitures of
performance security and faster legal recourse for breaches.
Action:
Amending the IBC to include specific enforcement mechanisms and dedicated NCLT
benches for monitoring and ensuring compliance with approved plans.
Develop
Sector-Specific Guidelines:
For complex
sectors like real estate, infrastructure, financial services (e.g., NBFCs), and
even startups, develop specific regulations or guidelines within the IBC
framework. These guidelines would address unique challenges, such as handling a
large number of homebuyers, regulatory approvals for infrastructure projects,
or the going concern value of technology companies.
Action:
IBBI, in consultation with sectoral regulators (e.g., RBI, SEBI, RERA), can
issue detailed regulations or guidance notes.
Refine
Valuation Standards and Practices:
Improve the
quality, consistency, and reliability of valuations under the IBC. This
involves developing more standardized valuation methodologies for distressed
assets, enhancing the regulatory oversight of Registered Valuers (RVs), and
providing continuous training to ensure high ethical standards and technical
competence.
Action:
IBBI can revise RV regulations, introduce mandatory continuous professional
development, and impose stricter penalties for fraudulent or negligent
valuations.
Facilitate
Cross-Border Insolvency Framework:
Expedite the
adoption and implementation of a comprehensive cross-border insolvency
framework, ideally based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.
This is crucial for Indian companies with assets or creditors abroad, ensuring
cooperation with foreign jurisdictions and efficient resolution of
multi-jurisdictional insolvencies.
Action:
Parliament needs to pass the enabling legislation, and India needs to sign
bilateral treaties or conventions with other countries to facilitate this.
Introduce
Group Insolvency Framework:
The
government's recent approval of a group insolvency framework is a positive
step. This framework needs to be enacted into law and effectively implemented.
It could provide mechanisms for coordinated resolution of financially linked
companies within a corporate group, avoiding fragmented and inefficient
proceedings.
Action:
Timely enactment of the proposed Group Insolvency Bill and development of clear
regulations by IBBI for its practical application.
Strengthening
Stakeholder Capacity and Oversight:
Continuous
Capacity Building for IPs and Stakeholders:
Conduct
regular, advanced, and specialized training programs for Insolvency
Professionals (IPs) covering complex legal, financial, and sector-specific
issues. Extend these training initiatives to NCLT/NCLAT members, legal
practitioners, and financial/operational creditors to enhance their
understanding of the IBC and their respective roles.
Action:
IBBI, in collaboration with professional institutes (e.g., ICAI, ICSI, IICA),
should design and deliver these training modules.
Enhance
Regulatory Oversight of IPs:
Strengthen the
IBBI's surveillance and disciplinary mechanisms over IPs. This includes more
proactive monitoring of their conduct, stricter enforcement of the Code of
Conduct, swift action against professional misconduct, and greater transparency
in disciplinary proceedings.
Action:
Increased resources for IBBI's surveillance department, leveraging technology
for monitoring, and clear guidelines for initiation and completion of
disciplinary actions.
Promote
Professional Code of Conduct for CoC:
While the CoC
has commercial wisdom, a non-binding "Code of Conduct" or best
practices guide for CoC members could encourage transparent, fair, and timely
decision-making. This would address issues like internal squabbles,
unreasonable demands, or lack of engagement, which often delay the process.
Action:
IBBI could issue guidelines or advisories promoting responsible conduct and
good governance practices within the CoC.
Strengthen
Information Utilities:
Further
mandate and incentivize the use of Information Utilities (IUs) for all
financial and operational creditors. Ensure that data submitted to IUs is
comprehensive, accurate, and regularly updated. Leverage technology to
seamlessly integrate IU data with NCLT proceedings for automated verification
of claims.
Action:
Introduce stricter penalties for non-compliance in data submission, further
enhance the data security and interoperability of IUs, and make IU records
conclusive evidence for default.
Addressing
Specific Gaps and Promoting Efficiency:
Clearer
Guidelines on Avoidance Transactions:
Provide more
precise statutory definitions and judicial precedents regarding preferential,
undervalued, and fraudulent transactions. Develop detailed operational
guidelines for Resolution Professionals on how to identify, investigate, and
pursue avoidance applications more effectively and within stricter timelines.
Action:
IBBI can issue detailed guidance notes, and judicial pronouncements from the
Supreme Court can provide much-needed clarity.
Address
Interplay with Other Laws:
Proactively
harmonize the IBC with other potentially conflicting statutes, such as the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), SEBI regulations, Income Tax Act,
and RERA. This can be achieved through legislative amendments to clarify
supremacy or through inter-regulatory coordination mechanisms.
Action:
Formation of an inter-ministerial/regulatory committee to identify and resolve
overlaps and conflicts, leading to necessary legislative changes.
Establish a
Dedicated Fund for CIRP Costs:
In cases where
the corporate debtor has minimal assets or funds, IPs often struggle to meet
the initial CIRP costs, leading to delays or even abandonment of the process.
Establishing a dedicated fund (perhaps from liquidation proceeds of other cases
or government allocation) to cover initial CIRP costs in such cases could
ensure the process does not halt due to lack of funds.
Action:
Government can establish a corpus fund, with clear eligibility criteria and
repayment mechanisms once assets are realized.
Post-Resolution
Monitoring Mechanism:
Implement a
robust mechanism to monitor the implementation of approved resolution plans and
the performance of resolved companies for a defined period (e.g., 2-3 years)
post-CIRP. This could involve periodic reporting requirements to IBBI or a
designated agency, ensuring the successful revival and long-term compliance of
the corporate debtor.
Action:
IBBI to develop a reporting framework and conduct periodic reviews, possibly
engaging independent auditors for this purpose.
These action
plans, if implemented comprehensively and with sustained political will, have
the potential to significantly enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, and
fairness of the IBC regime in India, contributing to a healthier credit
environment and improved ease of doing
Statistics
at a Glance (as of Q1 FY25):
Total CIRP
Cases Admitted: Over 8,002 cases since inception.
Cases
Closed: Approximately 75% of admitted cases have been closed
(resolution, withdrawal, liquidation).
Resolution
vs. Liquidation: In FY24, a record 269 resolution plans were
approved. The ratio of resolutions to liquidations improved from 21% (2017-18)
to 61% (2023-24), though liquidations still account for 45% of
closed CIRPs.
Recovery
Rates: Average recovery for financial creditors is 32% of admitted
claims. Against liquidation value, realization is higher (169%).
Time Taken:
Average CIRP time for resolved cases in FY24 was 843 days, highlighting
significant deviations from statutory timelines.
Behavioural
Shift: Over 26,518 applications (₹9.33 lakh crore default) were
withdrawn prior to admission (till Aug 2023), indicating the IBC's deterrent
effect and encouraging pre-emptive settlements.
Conclusion:
The IBC, in
its eight years, has significantly recalibrated India's credit ecosystem,
fostering a culture of timely debt repayment and improving recovery rates. The
constant amendments and regulatory fine-tuning reflect a commitment to
continuous improvement. However, persistent challenges, particularly judicial
backlogs and the need for deeper sectoral expertise, demand urgent and decisive
action. By aggressively expanding judicial capacity, embracing end-to-end
digitization, and enacting the proposed frameworks for group and cross-border
insolvencies, India can propel the IBC into its next phase of maturity,
ensuring it remains a powerful tool for economic stability and growth. The
journey of the IBC is a testament to India's dynamic legal and economic reform
agenda, steadily progressing towards a more efficient and effective insolvency
regime.